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1
Introduction

In 1963, American author Ayn Rand published For The New Intellectual. The book
would serve as the mark of an end of an era in libertarianism, not as a final articulation, but a
turn of libertarianism at a crossroads. From this crossroads, I argue that a new generation of
American libertarians, tentatively named the moral libertarians, emerged. Ayn Rand, Murray
Rothbard, and Robert Nozick will serve as representatives of three major interpretations within
this moral libertarianism: objectivism, anarcho-capitalism, and minarchism. However, these
moral libertarians, coming as a new generation in the tradition of libertarian thought, did not
escape the ground of the greater libertarian project: liberalism. Libertarianism necessarily is
constructed out of the ideological framework that liberalism passed down to it; the ideas and
vocabulary of the social contract theory, of the sovereign individual, of rights and their
protection.
Before the moral libertarians came their forefathers, the economic libertarian movement
led primarily by Hayek, along with acolytes and fellow travelers like Mises and Friedman. The
defining feature of these economic libertarians was arguing for free trade and a free society on
the basis of consequential arguments aimed towards standards of efficiency, wealth, and
democracy. Economic libertarianism operated on behalf of the liberal state, it was both a defense
of liberalism, and an attempt to pair together freedom of the economy with individual freedom so
that both could be protected. The division between the economic libertarians and the moral
libertarians is not totally distinct, but certainly there are some notable phenomena of the break
between the two ideological currents. Foremost is that the economic libertarians were reacting to
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totalitarianism and authoritarianism, largely fascism and bolshevism, by pushing liberalism as a
benevolent antagonist to these other systems of government. The moral libertarians wrote
screeds against the liberal state and its criminality, anti-rationalism, or moral turpitude, under the
shadow of the Vietnam War and rising into the social open-mindedness of the 1960’s.
Non-coercion as a moral absolute forced a combat with liberal norms on all new battlegrounds:
driver’s licenses, taxation-funded welfare, the police, entrepreneurship. Questions of
bureaucratic efficiency became questions of moral abominations, the priorities of the moral
libertarians were directed at a fundamentally more diverse set of institutions, the scale of the
state’s problematic status had grown, and the targets of libertarian ire had both diversified and
grown in mundanity. For the moral libertarians, essential features of liberal democracy became
tyranny, injustice, and coercion, yet again and again, the language and ideas of liberalism were
used in an attempt to pull out the rug from under liberal institutions. The libertarians began a
battle over the history of liberalism, drawing Locke, the Founding Fathers, and the early days of
the American project into a revisionist libertarian history. Libertarianism, in an almost-sarcastic
move, sought to appropriate the history of the ideology whose ideas it was already appropriating,
as if it was not already a corollary of liberalism.
The general ideology of moral libertarianism is postured as a critique which demands the
reduction, even at times the abolition, of the liberal state. However, moral libertarianism is
certainly not wanting for a diverse ideological terrain, each strain within it arrives at distinctly
different notions of the human good, of the basis and functionality of rights, and at the status and
scope of ‘the State’ versus ‘the Free-Market.’ Despite the diversity, the framework of
argumentation and the concepts at the core of their individual projects are all tied back to the
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great progenitor, liberalism. It is this space, between inheriting the liberal project and rejecting
the fruits of liberal ideology, which the ideology of moral libertarianism is navigating. This
generation of thinkers, to the point, are not the Hayekians, they are not classical liberals. On a
televised intra-party debate, there was a moment which captured the quintessence of moral
libertarian ideals at play. The then-potential candidate Gary Johnson, answering the question
“Should someone have to have a government-issued license to driver a car?”, offered the
seemingly common sense response, “A license to drive? You know, I’d like to see some
competency exhibited by people before they drive.” Johnson was immediately met with booing.
A question which could guide a study of this generation of libertarian thought might be: “How
are the moral libertarians making use of, and relating to, liberals ideas and vocabulary?” That
question is only born out of the exactly the tangible differences between moral libertarianism and
liberal norms which Johnson’s encounter with the libertarian electorate demonstrate.
Authors such as Ciepley and MacLean have already ventured accounts of the historical
emergence of libertarian thought, but the relationship of moral libertarianism to its parent
ideology, liberalism, as a matter of history and ideology, has not yet been sufficiently explored.
Ciepley argues that the history of the American encounter with totalitarianism gave both a
language and an impetus to invite the soft anti-government ideology of libertarianism into the
political mainstream.1 MacLean argues that wealthy interests, by funding specific, influential
actors, created a libertarian intellectual movement and covertly influenced the window of
acceptable political (and economic) ideologies to make space for a shadowy libertarian effort to
disempower the American government.2 Both of these findings are to some degree attempting to
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Ciepley, David, Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains, New York: Viking, 2017.
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find an origin point for the entry of libertarianism into the mainstream by dredging the historical
record. This project is also historical, but pushes back on two features of the former writers. The
first is the idea of libertarianism as essentially a big tent movement with similar priorities, which
Ciepley paints as a sort of an instrumentalized anti-totalitarian sentiment and MacLean paints as
the design of a few billionaires and their singular agent. The second feature is that both authors
are dealing with simplified models of what it means to be libertarian, without having given due
accounts of the internal heterogeneity or authentic intellectual currents of the movement. This
project intends to work against those latter premises to produce a conceptual account of a
significant historical shift, the flourishing of ‘moral libertarians’ in the late 1960’s and early
1970’s. The project is not about critiquing the ideas of libertarianism, that ground has been
thoroughly covered. Instead, it is a project about how ideologies interrelate, how ideology
appropriates history and is appropriated by history, and how new ideologies are born, and inherit
ideas from the ideologies which came before them.
The literature used for the study of this generation of libertarian thought will be drawn
from three principal texts, and then a range of non-historical secondary literature. The primary
three texts will be Rand’s For the New Intellectual, Rothbard’s For a New Liberty, and Nozick’s
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Each of these texts are intended to be examples of ‘mountains’ in
the landscape of the libertarian thought; comprehensive, popular, and prominent works of
libertarian thought according to the ‘strains’ of that era. The intent is to use the texts as snapshots
of the historical movements of the ideologies of libertarianism which were arising, and to be able
to reduce those movements down to critical texts for the purpose of analyzing towards a
composite picture.
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Ayn Rand, described as a ‘cult’ leader by Rothbard, represents the most bizarre and
emotionally evocative of the moral libertarians, contributing to libertarian thought while refusing
an association with libertarianism, calling herself an ‘objectivist’. Ayn Rand easily is the most
problematic author, as her most directly political work, For The New Intellectual, is an amalgam
of unadorned, amateur political philosophy and excerpts of Rand’s own literature. However, that
intersection also allows for Rand to serve as an author who both was actively building the
philosophical base of moral libertarianism, while also cultivating what might pass as libertarian
romanticism. Rand has the most cultivated individual following, per the ‘cultishness’ that
Rothbard ascribes to objectivism, there are many adherents who continue to honor her thought
even today, although Rand receives sparse serious academic treatment from outside her camp.
Rand’s role in the history of the moral libertarians is as the first expressor of the basic platform,
as well as functioning as a transitional figure for the purpose of understanding the origins of the
ideology.
Rothbard’s For A New Liberty offers a indictment of the concept of the liberal state
during the height of the involvement of the American government’s adventures in Vietnam, and
is both the author who first refined and clarified the ideas of moral libertarianism, also the most
ideologically extreme. Rothbard was Rothbard out of all the thinkers gets most directly at the
question of the state, and offers the most powerful and clear critique of the state, but leaves
important questions hung up with unsatisfying answers..
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a political philosophy text which
concludes that between the ideal state is a minimal one which upholds the Lockean rights of
proprietorship. Nozick is arguably the most influential libertarian academic ever, and modern
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libertarian intellectuals especially tend to refer to Nozick’s account of a morally righteous, and
thus minimal, state as perhaps the de facto account of an ‘ideal’ libertarian state. As the
Anti-Rawls, Nozick is the most visible and academically integrated member of the moral
libertarians. Nozick’s philosophy is interesting in that it achieves a minimal state from the same
basic assumptions as Rothbard (although both vary from their progenitor, Locke, in different
ways). Nozick is, in effect, the gateway between the moral libertarian movement at large and the
academy, and presents what is perhaps the most refined and developed form of the moral
libertarian argument.
The ideological discontinuity between the economic and moral libertarians is defined by
the two avenues of investigation. The first deals with conceptions of the state, and is an attempt
to expound upon how the moral libertarians are seemingly thinking about the liberal state in a
new way. Their critique is necessarily different from their forerunners in that it doesn’t assume
the liberal state, instead maintaining a critical stance towards liberal ideas and advancing
libertarian frameworks where their criticism successfully undermines the state. Looking at how
the core authors have been considering the state has been thus far revealing of a difference, but a
difference that will only be verified as actually being conceptually different with further study.
The second avenue is distinct but not disconnected from the first, and entails a consideration of
how the moral libertarians are playing with the ideas of liberalism. This sort of play is described
by how Rand weaves together capitalist rationality and the ubermensch, that Rothbard projects
the market society out past the liberal state that birthed it, that Nozick finds utopia to be the
reduction of the liberal state down into capitalist parklands. Understanding this sort of conceptual
play would also necessarily involve the first avenue, as the liberal state is so integrated in the
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schema of liberal ideas that eventually any concept-play would result in at least acknowledge the
state. Moreover, the war of ideas that these thinkers were engaged in, battling the tendrils of
Rooseveltian liberalism and as figures standing against the growing intellectual shadow of
Rawls, necessarily would involve contending with the expansion of state power that their
opponent ideologies advocated. These two avenues provide compelling frameworks for thinking
about the moral libertarians going forward, both as heuristics for separating out liberal ideas
being played with and ‘genuinely new’ libertarian ideas, and a methodology of understanding
how the disparities of libertarian thought still hold a commons, which might be revealed in
exploring them in relation to their ancestor ideology.
The exploration of these avenues requires two principal developments which the study of
the moral libertarians necessitates: the creation of a composite picture of the common ideological
material of the moral libertarians, and the analysis of that composite pictures on an integrated
conceptual and historical level. The creation of the composite picture will attend honestly to the
primary authors and their materials, and attempt to present them as a composite without denying
their heterogeneity, while also drawing out their concerns and relationships to other ideologies,
particularly liberalism. The composite picture will be explored in the first three sections of the
project, going over the core texts and understanding their ideas through close reading and
integration with the secondary literature. Each of the first three sections will be devoted to a
specific author of the moral libertarians. The fourth section will be reserved for a presentation of
how the three ideologies are being composited and then a general conceptual analysis. The
conceptual analysis will then take the findings of the composite picture and attempt to interrogate
them critically, and without cynicism, to try and expose how and why certain paradoxes or
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problems of the moral libertarianism ideology might be arising and addressable. The purpose is
not to either redeem or condemn the moral libertarians, but to perhaps more deeply understand
how their conceptual problems might be either misconstrued, appropriate in the historical
context, or actually revealing of an unspoken or under-acknowledged component of their
thought.
There is an immediate importance to understanding these dimensions in regards to this
specific generation of libertarian thinkers, as the modern Libertarian Party and its
small-government ilk are party to the general ideology these thinkers developed. The moral
libertarian ideology is taking further hold of a increasingly less furtive, and increasingly more
influential, corner of the American political landscape. Anecdotally, the Libertarian Party of the
United States’ membership has almost doubled in the last decade, and Gary Johnson polled at a
record 11% at one high point of his campaign as the Libertarian candidate. As libertarianism
waxes, it is imperative to understand the ideas of its most recent iteration without
mischaracterization and in regards to their context, so that it can be understood as libertarianism
writ large moves towards real decision-making power. By re-visiting the great thinkers of moral
libertarianism, there is a collective gain in comprehending precisely what sort of phenomena is
being represented in the modern face of libertarianism. This is not only important within the
sphere of political academics to comprehending an ascendent political tendency on a conceptual
level, but also to engaging with the vulgar libertarianism which has processed the ideas of these
great thinkers, and is attempting to carry them out in practical politics.

9
Rand
The ‘birth’ of moral libertarianism as a distinct strain of libertarian thought can be traced
back to the lurching ideological shift that began with Ayn Rand. The ‘lurching’ motion of the
birth of moral libertarianism refers to a marked break from the arguments of the libertarian
forefathers. which characterizes Rand’s foray into serious political writing, her For The New
Intellectual, calls attention to where precisely Rand finds herself in the flow of history. Rand’s
heterodox approach to the same question, how to advocate liberalism, is new in that Rand’s
emotive biases, her fundamental love for capitalism, shades the project with the moralist’s furor,
and passion. It is precisely that literary affect, Rand’s moralizing energy, which is transformed
by Rand into a system of political thought, meant to lionize the economic elite by giving them a
morality, to ‘defend’ the elite by arming them with a moral system.
Crucial to understanding the phenomena of Ayn Rand is understanding how Rand breaks
from the proto-libertarian thought exemplified in F. A. Hayek. Hayek must be understood in turn
as advocating for the free market and personal liberties not on lines of a morality, but almost as a
comparative study between top-down political structures, and bottom-up structures. The central
antagonist of Hayek’s political thought is planning, and how planning, particularly in terms of an
economic program but also in terms of the repercussions in legal and social systems. However,
the nuance of Hayek lies precisely in that Hayek’s analysis does not proceed from first
principles, allowing for intellectual space within Hayek’s arguments to make certain:

“It is important not to confuse opposition against [ top-down] planning with a dogmatic
laissez faire attitude. The liberal argument does not advocate leaving things just as they
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are; it favours making the best possible use of the forces of competition as a means of
coordinating human efforts. It is based on the conviction that, where effective
competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other.
It emphasizes that in order to make competition work beneficially a carefully thought-out
legal framework is required, and that neither the past nor the existing legal rules are free
from grave defects.”3

Hayek, perhaps precisely due to not grounding an argument for liberal capitalism in a
moral framework finds that ‘common-sense’ regulations, including labor laws and environmental
regulations, are not at odds with a liberal order.4 Of course there are claims to a certain morality
within Hayek’s writing, per an interjection on the origins of individualism: “Individualism [...] is
based on the respect of Christianity for the individual man and the belief that it is desirable that
men should be free to develop their own individual gifts and bents.”5 What might have been a
moral deferral to Christianity instead takes place as a referral to politics as originated in, and
perhaps justified by, Christianity. Of course in that referral there is of a moral injunction, towards
individualism. But the moral component comes into contact with Hayek’s general argument only
as a descriptive account of how this morality came to be. Indeed, Hayek argues for liberalism
and against authoritarianism along the lines of how the emergent orders of free-market
economies make for better societies along the lines of efficiency, wealth, productivity, options,
etc.

Friedrich Hayek, Road to Serfdom, London: Institute of Economic Affairs,1949 pg. 45, emphasis mine
Ibid, Road to Serfdom, pg. 46
5
Ibid, Road to Serfdom, pg. 42
3
4
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For The New Intellectual i s Ayn Rand’s rallying cry for a sort of ‘revolution’ within
intellectualism. Ayn Rand’s revolution ends in ‘integration,’ but this ‘integration’ is only
comprehensible within the historical architecture which Rand is using as her personal heuristic
for understanding history leading up to the establishment of the United States. The United States
is the end term of Rand’s history in that it was “the first society in history [...] led, created, and
dominated by the Producers.” The ‘Producer’ is a sort of synthetic (Rand uses the term
‘integrative’) historical archetype, representing a “type of man” who positively ‘integrates’ the
materialism and abstraction of the two negative archetypes. Rand uses the terms ‘Attila’ and
‘Witch Doctor’ to describe respectively both ends of a “soul-body dichotomy,” characterized
socially as “mindless, power-seeking looters” and “passive, death-worshipping mystics”
respectively. These archetypes are used by Rand to explain how America has entered into a stage
of “cultural bankruptcy,” that the ‘new men’ of America, the businessman and intellectual, have
been forced to provisionally hold the positions of Attila and Witch Doctor, but that both might
experience an integration of soul and body, into the intellect as it were. For Rand, the
businessman as “producer of wealth” and the intellectual as “purveyor of knowledge,” were
meant to .6 Rand epitomizes the social archetype of the producer in the form of the Founding
Fathers, “they were thinkers who were also men of action.” Critically for Rand’s attempt to tie
together her own political claims with the general claims about human ‘psycho-epistemology’
(Rand also offers the simpler synonym, ‘awareness’ and so both terms might be understood as
cognition) and philosophy, “[the Founding Fathers] proclaimed man’s right to the pursuit of
happiness and were determined to establish on earth the conditions required for man’s proper

6

Ayn Rand, For The New Intellectual, New York: Random House, 1963, pg. 24
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existence, by the ‘unaided’ power of the intellect.”7 Rand presents happiness as a ‘feeling,’ but
notes that for capitalism to be saved by a new intellectualism, American culture in general must
accept that “the emotions are not tools of cognition.” This pronouncement is only a splinter of
Rand’s overall critique of the established methods of thought.
Generally, Rand is dismissive of the philosophical tradition of the West, taking special
care to criticize the influence of Kant, “some monstrous spider hanging in midair” accepted by
the “major line of philosophers.”8 The quintessence of Rand’s rejection of Kant is that Kant
teaches that “reality, as perceived by man’s mind is a distortion.”9 The integration of reality with
conceptual thinking is precisely what enables the achievement of happiness, and for Rand,
capitalist society as originally prescribed by the United States. For Rand, the ultimate rule of the
integrative mentality is a ‘certainty’ which is assured by the un-restricted application of
rationality. The problem of philosophy, especially of Kant, but also of Hegel, Marx, and the
philosophers and philosophies of modernity. Rand isolates, oddly, existentialism and Zen
Buddhism as two examples of philosophies which are ‘against’ or have ‘betrayed’ capitalism as
an innovation towards human happiness via the liberation of human rationality. Another way of
interpreting the ‘failings’ of these philosophies is that they provide no means of justifying the
capitalist to himself, they only question and undermine the businessmen so as to push him into
the position of the historical Attila.
These terms, Attila and Witch Doctor, together form a mutually-constituted antipode of
the capitalist enterprise (America, namely) primarily by the fact that they cooperatively stifle the
circumstances necessary for the formation and maintenance of capitalist society. For Rand, the
Rand, For The New Intellectual, pg. 25
Ibid, pg. 34
9
Ibid, pg. 32
7
8
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businessmen and “intellectuals” of America have become subject to the need for a reintegration
into a synthetic ‘thinker.’ The confusion of terms is Rand’s own, many terms are given without
clarifying where differentiations or overlaps are occuring. Essentially, Rand can be read in such a
way that ‘thinkers’ is the name for the way of applying of one’s intellect both to one’s
physicality (engagement with the material) and one’s intellectuality (engagement with the
conceptual). That application of the intellect can be taken as definitional for Rand’s ‘rational
man,’ and thus the Founding Father’s are America’s “first and only intellectuals” in that they
apparently thought in this integrated sense. Implicitly in Rand’s account of America, the
Founding Father’s were able to be intellectuals in this sense due to their social role as Producers,
an account which to some extent is validated by the historical record, all of the Founding Fathers
being capitalists. Rand must be understood not trying to construct a causal account, but rather
trying to construct a framework by which a third party could understand Rand’s perception of
capitalism’s socio-cultural battle with “collectivism.” Collectivism for Rand is almost a positive
name for the negative phenomenon of the mortification of the individual. Even the apparent
‘greed’ of the Attila archetype is taken as an actual degeneration of the concept of capitalist
individualism, in that the destruction of property makes the actualization of the individual
impossible. Thus to be a ‘thinker’ is to apply rationality to empirical problems from the position
of an integrated “soul-body,” and thus to become a Producer, and Rand’s assertion is that that
process has been blocked by the established philosophy. The notion of the disagreement is that
men have been taught they cannot trust their senses, but to do capitalist business, to be concerned
with one’s own interests, there must be an empirical reality which is trusted enough to be labored
on by the cognition. At the back of it all, the interest of the capitalist entrepreneurs must be

14
sustained so that human good (examples include New York City, decreasing infant mortality,
and the reduction of labor hours after the Industrial Revolution) might be bettered by the creative
elites. The entire argument is essentially about a ruling class at all points, that world history is a
battle grounds between the alliance of the Attila and Witch Doctor against the Producers, at least
in world history post-America.
Despite Rand’s messianic disposition towards the American project, Rand proclaims that
“[various] degrees of government interference and control still [remain], even in America, as
deadly cracks in the system’s foundations.”10 However ‘government interference and control’ as
‘deadly’ is fraught within Rand’s own argument. The precise nature of what constitutes
interference must necessarily be cross-referenced against the outlines of “Attila-ism” and “Witch
Doctery.” What is clear from Rand’s account is that these archetypes are not outside of the
apparatus of state, despite what the characterizing name ‘Attila’ might connotate. Instead, these
archetypes, especially in Rand’s account of the medieval era, are compositional of the medieval
state, of kings and the priesthood. The problem of Rand is that to have a society which protects
the capacity of the Producer to be a entity within society but for himself actually mandates
precisely government interference. The government must interfere to protect property rights by
providing courts, law enforcement, and a military for the national defense to establish the
sovereignty of the Producer. For Rand then, interference per se is not the issue. The Producer, far
from being an emergent figure in human history, is for Rand the end of human teleology at the
level of a universal. Therefore, Rand’s notion of interference can be found to only implicate
forms of interference which undermine the movement of people towards this teleological end.

10
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15
Reading Rand in this way explains Rands insistence on a hygienic notion of social reformation
which the ‘new intellectuals’ are being urged to bring about. In this reformation, the only a priori
measure of what governmental actions might be ‘rational,’ that is, supportive of the Producer
teleology. And rationality is the only metric of the ‘true,’ rationality arbitrates the ‘true’ but fails
to actually do anything as an enforcement measure.
In the greater framework of the emergence of moral libertarianism, Rand is not creating a
reliable framework of conceptual thought, but is instead generating narratives of social and
intellectual history which presents capitalism and its bannermen, the businesspeople, as
maximally rational, and thus maximally human, ways of social being. This hyper-individualism
is actually, and bizarrely, integrative with society-wide vision, in which the unrestrained
‘entrepreneur’ figures who make up the Producers better society from thee top-down. The
question for Rand is not actually of the individual against society, it is about the happiness and
well-being of people writ large being overseen by an elite that is revealed by the rational
competition of business. It is notable that Rand’s The Fountainhead is featured prominently, and
whose protagonist actually forgoes financial gain and business success so that the O’Rourke’s
architectural vision will not be ignored. It presumes an almost Nietzschean read of the
entrepreneur figure, a tendency which has been noted repeatedly by commentators on Rand. The
‘Ubermensch’ of the entrepreneur is of course, being appropriated for a work urging a
political-intellectual rejuvenation at the beginning of the 1960s. From the historical vantage point
of 1961, the Nazi regime and fascism generally had been defeated soundly by the forces of
capitalist liberalism. Soviet and Chinese communism had expanded, but the open conflict
between major liberal and totalitarian powers was over. This breathing room meant that the
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hyper-individualistic ‘rationality’ of Rand might go from a critique of totalitarian statism into a
manifesto of liberal capitalist heroism. The difficulty of addressing the United States as a subject
of critical discussion was that distinguishing ‘the Producers’ from the economic elite is not an
easy task along the lines of Rand’s critique. For Rand, some unknown percentage of the rich
were not Producers despite their economic output, instead being cast by Rand as beneficiaries of
government contracts, legal machinations, and other illegitimate benefits derived from their
symbiotic relationship with the state.
The problem of the crony capitalist, although Rand may not have been equipped with that
language, is the problem of Rand attempting to define morality from a sort of first principles,
survival in the world. Ignoring the biological claims of Rand, that the human being possesses no
instincts which animals benefit from, the overdetermination of rationality poses problems
generally for Rand’s attempt to inherit from Aristotle. Virtue ethics, which are posited
intermittently in Rand create problems in that Rand is attempting to define a ‘good’ while also
grounding that good in rationality. Rationality must be submitted to a good for Rand’s virtue
ethics to function, but that claim ignores certain problems of defining what rationality is and
what constitutes a rational decision. If performing the rational determines the good, but the
rational must be constrained by a ‘good,’ then good must be pre-rational. Even taking Rand at
face, the rational as means of determining survival does not account for the moral status of
wealth, nor does it account for how, circumstantially, it might not be rational to act ‘immorally.’
Rand’s thoughts on these conflicts do not necessarily offer up satisfying philosophical answers.
To that extent, the virtue ethics of Rand must be considered as not being about rationality per se,
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but rather separated out and examined differently. The open comparison between Rand and
Nietzsche seemingly offers some insight into the problem of Randian rationality.
Rand reinscribes the Nietzschean will to power within capitalist rationality. Rand
synonymizes rationality and morality after establishing rationality not only as volitional,11 but
also as the condition of survival, i.e. where an animal has survival instincts, the human being has
survival rationality. The tripartite structure of rationality-morality-survival, from whichever
‘edge’ of the trinity it is approached by Rand or a would-be acolyte, results in the same ultimate
consequence. The man who seeks to be moral must apply their rationality so that they might
survive. To survive, man must apply their rationality, and thus acts morally. These definitions
aren’t strictly circular, but are obviously deeply inter-involved. Rand describes an emergent
hierarchy out of rationality -which ties the moral element to it- along the lines of an implied limit
of ability. Rand denies that this could be related to biology, circumstance, or other influences
outside of one’s control by predefining rationality as a choice. That could be axiomatically
written as ‘the moral option is to seek the highest position within one’s ability.’ Thus corporate
ambition is actually transformed into a virtue of the moral actor, to not practice that virtue is be
less moral. By creating a moral system which pursues virtues, Rand is able to avoid being in the
position of telling someone else what to do. Rand’s advice is to not take advice, to rely on one’s
own rationality as guidance. The problem is that Rand addresses rationality but presents
rationality in such a way as to create a confusing space in which rationality, the ability to act, and
intelligence are somewhat confused together. Seemingly, intelligence and rationality are not
synonymous for Rand, but if they are not, it must be asked whether or not Rand correlates the

11
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two. If intelligence is rationality, or there is an effective relationship between the two, then the
implication is that there are natural and emergent hierarchies. Rand argues for these hierarchies
bi-directionally: it is good for the able to occupy the best jobs, and it is bad for the less able to
live above their rational capacity.12 The softly-defined topography of Rand’s hierarchicalism is
somewhere between the intonations of ‘caste’ and ‘niche,’ but both evoke Rand’s moral
imperative to embody one’s kinetic economic stature. It is precisely at this point that Rand’s
re-inscription of the will to power begins to explore new and fertile ground, namely in that the
‘to power’ might be taken in Rand as ‘to capability.’ The Producers are harassed from above and
below by the state and the masses, two appendages of jealousy which are then justified in their
condemnation of the wealth and status of the productive ones by ‘the intellectuals.’ For Rand, the
appropriate modifications to this system would be involved with the process of giving the now
beleaguered businessmen the moral system to retaliate to the claims of the state and masses to
their wealth. But Rand drives moral dividers between the wealthy as such, and the Producers
who have wealth as a consequence of generating wealth and making good products. The
Nietzschean Wille zur Macht is situated in an anti-morality, in the exposure of the servile
genealogy of Judeo-Christian morality. Yet Nietzsche’s victorious archetype the ‘blonde beast,’
is distinguished from the Randian capitalist hero in that the naturalization of conquest is replaced
with the moralization of emergently determined capitalist hierarchies.
Close reading Rand, it is easy to see how the professed free-market spirit of Rand maps
fittingly with an aristocratic tendency:
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“Capitalism demands the best of every man—his rationality—and rewards him
accordingly.”
The element of ‘demanding the best’ and the ‘accordance’ of the rewards indicates
already that the ends of capitalist life are tied explicitly to means, the two are almost inseparable.
This not only assumes categories of people based on capitalist ‘rewards’, but also implicitly
favors the born-wealthy and the prodigal genius. Thus the most successful category of person are
already aligned in Rand with aristocratic archetypes through the implicit description of
capitalism, although this is not yet fully fleshed out.
“[Capitalism] leaves every man free to choose the work he likes, to specialize in it, to
trade his product for the products of others, and to go as far on the road of achievement as his
ability and ambition will carry him. His success depends on the objective value of his work and
on the rationality of those who recognize that value. When men are free to trade, with reason and
reality as their only arbiter, when no man may use physical force to extort the consent of another,
it is the best product and the best judgment that win in every field of human endeavor, and raise
the standard of living—and of thought—ever higher for all those who take part in mankind’s
productive activity.”
Ability and ambition are mentioned in Rand as two variables of capitalist success, but
must be understood as actually interoperating on a level at which the two inform one another.
Ability is only manifested into success through ambition, but the extent of ambition is informed
via ability, or as Rand proclaims the synthesis: “to cheat your way into a job bigger than your
mind can handle is to become a fear-corroded ape on borrowed motions and borrowed time, and
to settle down into a job that requires less than your mind’s full capacity is to cut your motor and
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sentence yourself to another kind of motion: decay.” But the language of universalism is
misleading, in that it would seem to be a philosophy for universal man, it is actually in
celebration of the beleaguered upper class. If this is not evident enough in that a sub-section is
titled “The Martyrdom of the Industrialists,” then it can become evident in the consideration of
the next passage. Rand also here intonates the ‘best product,’ and the meaning of ‘best’ can be
contended with in either an aristocratic or Darwinian sense, as the best in the sense of an ideal, or
the best in terms of the situation it finds itself in, of a ‘best’ of the marketplace. Rand favors the
former contention, in her assertion that “the man who holds high standards of craftsmanship, but
devotes his effort to the production of trash—these are the men who have renounced matter, the
men who believe that the values of their spirit cannot be brought into material reality.” Yet
‘trash’ might refer to the the cheapest product, made shoddily but affordably, and in that
meaning conforms to certain expectation of the market to provide for demands at all levels of
capacity to buy. The layman’s jacket is not the same as the rich man’s jacket, but to provide a
jacket to every man requires some production of ‘trash’. The problem is the ambiguity of ‘trash’
as a turn of phrase, but seated within the larger aristocratic tendency of Rand, it seems clear that
trash is to some extent tied up in craftsmanship.
“By creating a mass market, [the businessman] makes these products available to every
income level of society. By using machines, he increases the productivity of human labor, thus
raising labor’s economic rewards. By organizing human effort into productive enterprises, he
creates employment for men of countless professions. He is the great liberator who, in the short
span of a century and a half, has released men from bondage to their physical needs, has released
them from the terrible drudgery of an eighteen-hour workday of manual labor for their barest
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subsistence, has released them from famines, from pestilences, from the stagnant hopelessness
and terror in which most of mankind had lived in all the pre-capitalist centuries—and in which
most of it still lives, in non-capitalist countries.”
Here, the aristocrat-businessman becomes a romantic ‘great liberator,’ the organizers of
the Industrial Revolution which saved (released perhaps) humanity from an array of miseries.
The figureship of the “the great liberator” is the clarion moment of Rand’s aristocracy, it places
the ambiguous businessman not only as figure of excellence, but also as a figure of deference.
The less capable owe gratitude to the businessman, who have become their betters through the
diffuse benefaction of capitalism-fueled development, as Rand lists in the selected quotation. The
mass market also becomes the product of the businessmen as much as the goods which are rolled
off Fordist factory belts. In that way, the businessman actually manifests the actual social space
of capitalism. It becomes difficult in Rand to actually distinguish capitalism as a system apart
from the businessmen because this dynamic pervades Rand’s discourse capitalism. Capitalism is
always for Rand the system which rewards the best, but also, as in aristocracy, it is a system
which emanates from the capacity of the best to govern it.
Despite that, capitalism remains a system of government which in the American context,
towards which Rand is posturing her writings, is tied up with democracy (or at least
republicanism) and is thus tied to the rule of the masses. Rand calls for a political movement
which will see the arrival of ‘conservative’ intellectuals and politicians (the cronies of the
intellectuals in Rand’s eyes) not afraid to defend the rights of the Producers to the rewards of
their creative efforts. But, as anyone can ultimately succeed in Rand’s framework, and in
contention with the actual state of the American political apparatus, Rand’s aristocracy is faced
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with the question of how it is meant to survive amongst a non-benefitting mass. Furthermore,
Rand does not offer exact prescriptions to the problem of reforming the political situation, this
text is meant partially as a display of the ideals of Randian capitalism. Precisely the difference
between Rand and the other authors of this generational milieu, especially Rothbard and Nozick,
is that with the arrival of Rothbard, the upwards-facing (aristocratic) moralization has been
replaced by a moral attitude towards specific actors which can only be described as Darwinian.
The difference between these two moral attitudes is accompanied also by a revisitation of how
the moral is meant to function to ground and shape a libertarian society. By the publishing of
Rothbard’s For A New Liberty, the morality of libertarianism has been transformed, and started
to become more and more entangled with the tradition of political philosophy as its prescriptive
capability disappeared. In Rothbard, we find a libertarian morality which demands only a single
principle to define every aspect of political life, and thus more applicable, and harder to contest.
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Rothbard
“Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for
each man’s survival and prosperity that he be free to learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act
upon his knowledge and values. This is the necessary path of human nature; to interfere with and
cripple this process by using violence goes profoundly against what is necessary by man’s nature
for his life and prosperity. Violent interference with a man’s learning and choices is therefore
profoundly “antihuman”; it violates the natural law of man’s needs”13

Those words reverberate with the clinical fury with which Rand took to trying to dismantle a
society which had begun to build for itself an ethos of sharing, embodied in the New Deal. But
this claim to the rights of the producer class against “[v]iolent interference,” was an expression
of a ‘new intellectual,’ and of a widening in the intellectual landscape of the nascent moral
libertarianism. Murray Rothbard, Austrian economist amongst other titles, took up the mantle of
moral libertarianism in the work For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, whose
publishing marked a substantial development in the approach to a moral theory of libertarianism.
Rand’s work was marked by an inability to restrain itself to the limitations of its initial claims,
not helped by the idiosyncratic language and intentional ignorance of the philosophical canon,
leading to ungrounded moral pronouncements. Rothbard, a member of the academy and a more
disciplined thinker, rather than attempting to build on Rand’s auteur philosophy, developed a
more rigid and systematic ethics. The moral arguments of Rand are developed by Rothbard’s
capacity to interface moral libertarianism consistently with logical frameworks, often drawn
from academic sources which Rand either disregarded or was unaware of. Rothbard bases his
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own political theory in the philosophy of Locke, Weber, and other confirmed members of the
liberal political canon whose ideas have faced public trial through generations of intellectuals.
Standing on the shoulder of giants, and
In the refinement that the moral argument for libertarianism undergoes in Rothbard,
many of Rand’s core contentions from For The New Intellectual a re represented with new
arguments to support them, in a more systematic philosophical format which is more congruent
with the intellectual history of liberalism and libertarianism. Rand’s ultimate project, of creating
a morality for the ‘Producer’ class, is validated in Rothbard, who describes the ‘ state’ as “a
legal, orderly, systematic channel for predation on the property of the producers.”14 However,
exactly in the way that Rothbard here attributes the ‘predation’ of the producers to the state,
Rothbard’s general understanding of the state and its role in the politics of libertarianism differ
remarkably from Rand. In Rand, the ideal political situation is in many ways informed by the
early American republic, and maintains a fixation on restoring and reforming the current
American state back to the glory of the Founding Fathers. Rothbard also breaks from Locke by
rejecting the conception of a social contract as it were,15 which in turn rejects any narrative of the
state as an entity which was formed or which is based on democratic and consensual
participation.16
For A New Liberty as an intellectual project might be understood primarily as an
extended critique of statism through the application of a moral philosophy with libertarian
characteristics to the problems of the contemporary state. The form a ‘moral philosophy with
libertarian characteristics’ takes is a deontological system of thought in which the governing
Rothbard, For A New Liberty, pg. 61
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assumptions are self-ownership as the fundamental and conditional fact of property rights, with
those property rights being a morally inviolable and metaphysically inherent fact of each person.
The moral philosophy which Rothbard presents is built on the natural-rights account from Locke,
and the Rothbard is a son of liberalism only to the extent that the free-market, and the property
rights which gives mandate to the free-market, are also tied up with liberalism. As Rand might
shame crony capitalism as a sort of falsehood, Rothbard denounces it as an institution of the
state, urging towards the capacity of a repressed competition to take place and unseat
monopolies, corporate giants, and other monsters of the regulated marketplace. It is insurgent in
that way, it fixates itself on a majority, but lays claim to that majority by condemning the
artificial successes which are bred at the intersection of government and big business. It’s
Darwinism, that asserts that the evolutionary dead ends posed by wasteful and bloated companies
will be unseated by the fitter, the more maneuverable, the underdogs, is also somewhat
egalitarian.17 It poses a vision of the future in which every man becomes a capitalist. That shift
between Rand and Rothbard happens precisely because Rothbard is not interested in the texture
of behavior, but only in a binary of interaction. Freedom does not, for Rothbard, intersect with
virtue. The N.A.A. is a moral idea, but it’s morality is almost programmatic, an algorithm by
which a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can be posited but with none of the emotive elements of Rand, nor
assigning heroism to the moral agents. The N.A.A. is also conceptually blind to what its moral
agents look like, and cannot make claims about how society should be shaped. In that way,
Rothbard is also writing a morality which is more market-like, it orders human moral
interactions in the same emergent manner as a pure theory of the market sees economic
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interactions as emergently ordered. In that sense, Rothbard might even be read as a synthetic
figure between Rand and Hayek, binding together the economic and moral arguments in a way
which gives moral right to the legacy of Hayek, but which burns off the impurities of Rand’s
virtuism. These impurities might be listed as Rand’s hero-worship, her behavioral dictates, and
inability to ground private property except negatively, demanding the gratitude of the working
class.
“[The libertarian] insists that whatever services the government actually performs could
be supplied far more efficiently and far more morally by private and cooperative enterprise.”18
From Rothbard’s own axiomatic logic, ‘society,’ or any other organization in the ‘public,’ does
not exist per se, and is only a nomenclature for a set of real individuals in the same way as a
company refers to many people working to create a product or service. However, the state is not
only another form of social organization, Rothbard has distinguished the state a ‘criminal band,’
which is to say that the state, unlike other modes of social formation, is an abstraction which
shapes individual behavior which always i nfringes on the rights of those it proposes to govern.
This criticism of the state generates certain problems, but also provides an effective limit of the
logic of the moral libertarian position, the goal of complete replacement of the state by private
operators and organizations.19 The main problem of this criticism of the state is the way in which
it compromises the social theory Rothbard constructs. Rothbard attempts to establish the ‘ state’
as an abstraction which bears no meaningful differentiations from any other abstract social
formation. The state is also, however, defined by the function of maintaining a ‘monopoly’ on
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violence within its jurisdiction. The tension which exists in the way that the state is characterized
by Rothbard must both be an abstraction which does. The state defends the rights of its citizens
through law enforcement, via the collective action of the legislators, police, and the courts, as per
the Lockean historical movement from nature to political society. Law, and its enforcement, as
Rothbard describes its hypothetical anarcho-capitalist form, takes on a striking similarity to
exactly the structures which Rothbard is attempting to subvert.
The problem presented by law is that law and its enforcement, which is considered
necessary by Rothbard, creates situations in an anarcho-capitalist thought experiment which blur
the lines between statism and solutions provided by the market. Rothbard’s position on the
subject of enforcement in regards to anarcho-capitalist law is that “[o]n the free market, what
would be enforced is whatever [laws] the customers are willing to pay for.”20 However, Rothbard
also declares, “there will have to be a legal code in a libertarian society,” meaning a legal code
which is universally understood and accepted, and which conforms to libertarian moral
principles.21 Rothbard immediately qualifies such a legal code, adding the caveat that any legal
code which includes law that violate the non-aggression axiom, or courts which uphold any such
laws “would be illegal in terms of libertarian principle, and could not be upheld by the rest of
society”22 What Rothbard does not and perhaps cannot provide, is a mechanism which would
cause the formation of an anarchist situation in which society “would insist on the libertarian
principle of no aggression against person or property, define property rights in accordance with
libertarian principle, set up rules of evidence [...] in deciding who are the wrongdoers in any
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dispute, and set up a code of maximum punishment for any particular crime.”23 Even providing
for the acceptance of a libertarian legal code universally, the problem arise of how enforcement
and punishment is to be resolved in a way which is firstly, not in violation of the rights of the
perpetrator, and secondly, allows for the enforcement agencies to be also restrained by the rule of
the legal code. The second clause encompasses the first, as without any mechanisms in place to
somehow bind the actions of private law enforcement agencies to the libertarian legal code, there
is no ability to guarantee that those agencies will actually respect either the legal code, or the
non-aggression axiom in their actions.
Working through these conditions of a libertarian law in reverse, Rothbard notably does
not produce at all a justification for why the network of private courts and police forces would
agree upon on a universal libertarian code, or why, even if they would, why it would be a legal
code based on libertarian principles. The looming element, although it is unaddressed by
Rothbard beyond mentioning it as a possible arbitrator, is “the rest of society.” Society, as
Rothbard has already established, is an abstract set which includes all individuals within an
ambiguous network of social and economic interactions, it is “non-existent” as an entity in its
own right. Therefore there is no ‘higher good’ to appeal to, but instead for the “rest of society” to
refuse to uphold a legal code would require individuals, en masse, to refuse the authority of a
legal code. The narrative underlying this assertion is a variant of the Lockean doctrine of
revolution, substituting tyrannical rule for law which infringes on the non-aggression axiom, and
revolution with a refusal to “uphold” the legal code. What is meant by “uphold” is not laid out in
Rothbard explicitly, but it can be taken from the following passages that Rothbard sees most
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problems within a private market legal system as being solvable by the power of consumer
patronage. However, patronage works within a multiplicity system for patronage to even be
considered as a solution to social problems, there must always be alternatives which can be
favored so as to shift the system. But Rothbard’s legal code is singular, there are not competing
codes, but one code developed by the ‘competition’ of many judges and courts. To not be
‘upheld’ would mean that courts which enforce an illegitimate variant of the legal code would
have to be rejected by consumers to such a degree as to nullify those aberrant courts, police
departments, etc. The problem then is precisely what if the “rest of society,” in which Rothbard
lodges the entire possibility of salvation, were not a ‘Libertarian Society?’ For as much as
Rothbard rejects the need for the transformed man, without the transformed society what is to
stop the emergence of any other political ideology in the ‘vacuum’ of anarchic libertarianism?
The problem for Rothbard is not whether or not the account of an emergent libertarianism is
viable in the private market system, but why other political ideologies are less viable as
possibilities.
The argument must render the liberal state ultimately indistinguishable on a moral level
from the governments of totalitarianism, and their forms of violence and control. However, in
staking that claim, Rothbard also demonstrates the power of thinking from moral first principles
to dissolve the political identities of liberalism, fascism, communism, and so on into one
textureless entity, the state. Liberalism, and by extension all other ideologies and forms of
government based in either direct or representative democracy, problematizes Rothbard’s model
of a universal state. Taking liberalism as the paramount example—on account of the fact that
American liberalism is the central object of Rothbard’s criticism—Rothbard makes two claims
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which are meant to undermine liberalism’s claim to a consensual relationship with the governed.
The first is in fact a set of claims which generally challenge the ability of the American state, as
matter of historical fact, to defend the rights of its citizens. This set of claims can be ignored for
the purpose of evaluating Rothbard’s argument, as they are essentially supplementary to the main
theory, but must be noted so the reason. The second claim is that the theory of the social contract
is untenable on the basis that the historical origins of any given state “generally began in
violence and conquest [and] never by general consensus or contract.”24 This critique of the social
contract essentially alleges that the there is no historical point at which any state was
operationally ‘just’ (according to Rothbard’s natural-rights ethics) as there was no point at which
the state was actually in voluntary accord with all of its members. The idea of the Lockean
consensus, by which a group of individuals escapes from the state of nature, and collectively
defers their powers of self-defense to the state, is thereby invalidated. The precarity of the
argument is that the extent to which Rothbard is able to separate the natural-rights argument of
Locke from the Lockean consensus is also the extent to which central ideas to Rothbard’s
hypothetical anarcho-capitalism can also be questioned. The Lockean consensus is premised on
the idea that by the consent of any number of individuals, the right to punish is submitted up to
government. The presumption is not that the government lays special privilege to the authority of
violence, “legitimacy” would be Rothbard’s term, but rather that the right to punishment are
somehow transferable if one consents. Taking as given the situation Rothbard describes, in
which there is a system of courts which all subscribe to a basic libertarian legal code, and there
are many protection agencies that work alongside these courts, it must be considered what occurs
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when two citizens who are both members of one protection agency are to do when one violates
the rights of the other. The protection agency, which is obligated by contract to both parties to
protect their rights, cannot allow either party to maintain their individual right to punish the
other, and so are at the very least incentivized by their contractual relationships to restrain the
aggrieved party from punishing the other without ‘due process.’ The problem that is created is
that the protection agency, in order to fulfill its contractual obligation to both parties, is morally
required to actually infringe on the right to punish in the case of both parties in order to
guarantee the protection of its clients.25 Whether or not this narrative is convincing is irrelevant
to the point, as the initial argument Rothbard makes is made on exactly the same lines,
rationalizing what behaviors protection agencies would take on in an anarchist situation. The
essential conclusion is that the behavior of these protection agencies cannot be regulated, but
also that if their benevolence is assumed, it could as easily take the form of the social contract
which Rothbard sought to avoid. Performing the service of law enforcement, at some point,
requires the deferral of some rights so as to be able to prevent wanton violence, exactly as
explained in Locke’s state of nature. Thus the ultimate critique of liberalism, although it does not
fail, actually reveals that there are circumstantial conditions in which the anarchist law
enforcement mechanisms begin to take on an uncanny resemblance to the liberal state. In that
way, the foundational claim, that the state is always different from the
The framework for anarchic law which Rothbard proposes comes already accompanied
by an implicit theory of justice, based upon understanding the exchange of actions which the
non-aggression axiom gives description to. The non-aggression axiom bifurcates all human
25
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action into the category of aggressive or non-aggressive action, either violating the property
rights of others or not. From this, it follows that just circumstances are such wherein no
individual’s property rights are being violated by the aggression others. To establish the initial
circumstances by which possessions are acquired and transformed into the property of an
individual as just, Rothbard affirms Locke’s labor theory of property.26 However, upon the
violation of an individual rights, or the attempt at violation, individuals are entitled to certain
forms of response. The implicit Rothbardian theory of justice which follows from those premises
is that there is a system for determining just and unjust actors in a given interaction, which can
be ascertained by tracking how exchanges of aggression occur and resolve, so as to determine
who in a given exchange is or was entitled to self-defense, retribution, or restitution. Retribution
and restitution are owed particular attention, as Rothbard later devised a method of determining
the theoretical “maximum limit” on the right to punishment of either type through a
“proportionate principle.” The proportionate principle is defined as entailing that “the criminal
loses rights to the extent that he deprives the victim.”27 For Rothbard, proportionality amounts to
the functional doubling of the punishment in proportion to the crime, which means that an assault
might be responded to with a more vicious assault, and a theft might demand restitution of the
original stolen amount, and also compensation of the same amount. However, the theory of
proportionate punishment exposes pragmatic problems which the anarchic state of law and its
enforcement create. Firstly, unless proportionality is intended strictly as a theoretical exercise,
who is meant is to enforce the rule of proportionality? As Rothbard considers it, “if Hatfield,
merely beat up McCoy, and then McCoy kills him in return, this too would put McCoy up for
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punishment as a murderer.”28 However, in an anarchic system, as Locke recognized and
described, precisely the problem is that there is no de facto authority which will either enforce
the rule of proportionality, nor defend the rights of the victim—it is a state of war. Self-defense
is unlimited in this system to precisely the extent that Locke described the ignorance of the
victim: until a crime has been committed, the victim might always assume the possibility of a
murderous threat, and therefore exact any form of self-defense they deem necessary.29 Rothbard
is able to justify the argument of proportionality only on the assumption that in an anarchic
system, all security agencies and all private courts would be generally cooperative, and a
reasonable majority would have access to both resources. If justice then is based on a general
respect for the non-aggression axiom amongst the masses, and proportionality in all forms of
response to aggression except self-defense, then there must be some means by which both
standards can be maintained. Rothbard addresses murder as posing a problem in that the success
of a murder necessarily means the responsibility for punishment must either be transferred or
dissipate. Assuming, as Locke does, that the relationship between an individual and a protection
agency is such that The problem is not that Rothbard is necessarily incorrect, but only that
insofar as Rothbard is making claims that are contingent on certain necessary circumstances,
counter-claims might be lodged by reasonably modifying the circumstances. Furthermore,
Rothbard, throughout all discussions of punishment, always asserts that the primary purpose of
punishment is always, and should always be restitution. As will be explored in the upcoming
discussion of Nozick, the implications of always holding out compensation as a means of
achieving justice is that compensation might become a tool for creating systems in which
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substantial infringement upon the property rights of individuals can be morally negated. And this
only compounds the problem of the lack of structural or implicit regulations upon the agencies
which are meant to be doing the work to maintain the N.A.A.
There are no guarantees to the maintenance of the N.A.A. without an overarching body
with an interest or a mandate in enforcing the N.A.A. Although Rothbard would assert that there
are principles of emergent order which would shift the market of legal practice towards the
N.A.A., the claim is inherently unprovable. Moreover, within the larger claim by free-market
political agents to the privileging of emergence, why wouldn’t there be a multiplicity of
ethico-legal systems on offer? The answers are unclear, and should be taken as the
anarcho-capitalist system running up against the limitations of its own capacity to address the
state rather than liberalism. The difference is crucial: a critique of liberalism refines a model, a
critique of the state attempts to radically redefine what it means to be in a society. The latter
project is fine, but in Rothbard’s account there is not enough consideration given to how markets
and the state interact with one another.
Rothbard’s deontological approach to moral libertarianism remains a powerful and
consistent critique of the state, but that critique is itself largely a rearticulation of previous
thinkers.30 The problematic element of the anarcho-capitalist argument are the circumstantial
arrangements which were required to maintain a cohesive and functional model of an anarchist
society accommodating capitalism and property rights. Although these claims are neither
provable nor disprovable given the absence of an attempted anarcho-capitalist society, the
ambiguities which are generated leave Rothbard’s system of thought exposed to replacement by
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a system with a more powerful explanatory power. The inability to account for possibility of a
state re-forming out of anarchy, the moral problem of compensation and restitution, and being
able to assume the appropriate behavior of the private protection agencies all remain open for
critique.
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Nozick

Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by Robert Nozick’s own attribution, was the tangential result
of a conversation between Nozick and Murray Rothbard.31 Rothbard created a substantial and
robust system of thought for defending libertarianism and critiquing the State deontologically.
However, at the fringes of Rothbard’s system, there were substantial unresolved ambiguities,
which did not necessarily problematize the anarcho-capitalism, but which left key parts of the
argument in states of conjecture. The legacy which Rothbard passed on to Nozick was a legacy
of conjecture open to solutions. Nozick, a technician of morality, developed Rothbard’s system
of thought by providing substantive, plausible responses and solutions to some of the major
ambiguities from Rothbard. The conclusions are a surprising severe turn back into the minarchist
position, which roughly corresponded to Rand’s preferred government. The difference between
minarchist and anarchist position is probably the most substantive difference between the two
thinkers, although it does not take place along a regression to Randian logic, but rather an
advancement along lines of thought which Rothbard paved. Nozick returns the state to moral
libertarianism, as part of a corrective measure of ambiguities which were playing out in
Rothbard.
Nozick complicates the idea of a state by examining area where the ambiguous metrics
which define statehood create “statelike entities,” or entities which operate somewhere between
the definitions of “dominant protective agencies” and “states.” Nozick negatively defines the
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“statelike entity” against the dominant protective association, claiming that the protective agency
“makes no such claim [to be the sole authorizer of violence.]”32 The “statelike entity,” by the
same negative definition, is also a historical stage in the progression from anarchy to statehood in
which the protective agency finally does make a claim to being the authorizer of violence.
Nozick explicitly presents that historical transition as inevitable due to the emergent pressures
such as the demand for protection and for consistent and persistent means for protecting property
rights.33 Presenting the appearance of the minimal state as an emergent phenomenon of the state
is another manner in which Nozick affirms certain dogmas of liberalism. Social contract theory
is one such dogma enmeshed with liberalism, and particularly with strains of liberalism with
libertarian bents, not only due to the foundational proximity of social contractarianism to Locke,
but also, as Neidleman renders it, “[social contract theory] presupposes the fundamental freedom
and equality of all those entering into a political arrangement and the associated rights that
follow from the principles of basic freedom and equality.”34 Rothbard contested social contract
theory by claiming that origin of most states was in the violent conquest of one group by another
group, a claim which positions the state as originating in, and thus inextricable from, violence.35
Nozick’s return to social contract theory indicates that within the intellectual movement of the
moral libertarianism, the relative radicalism of Rothbard neither prevailed, nor, by accounts of
the modern libertarian party and its platform, has the anarchist tendency succeeded there.
Rothbard’s account, regardless of being more or less historically plausible as an account of state
origins, leads to inevitable tensions when Rothbard attempts to claim a stateless future as the
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method by which to achieve a reality in which natural rights are more strongly upheld. The social
contract theory essentially, although not absolutely, is defined as the emergence of a state out of
anarchism. Rothbard’s suggestion that states are born out of conquest, and warring tribes, asserts
a vision of the pre-state existence, which is at least superficially anarchism, as a situation in
which conquest and violence overturned the freedom and independence of certain groups by
other certain groups. Rothbard does not distinguish whether and how a new, capitalist anarchism
would differ from this primordial anarchism, which leaves open the question of whether or not
the reemergence of the state also threatens the capitalist anarchism Rothbard advocates.
The stark definition of the state, which Rothbard adapts from Weber, strips the concept of
the state of it's nuance, and reduces the state to a single concept despite the obvious multiplicity
of the state's forms and historical stages, as well as the function it provides at those different
stages. Nozick begins to undo Rothbard’s reductionism by creating new conceptual categories
for understanding the historical stages of the state, how those different stages have separate
functions and attend to different moral considerations. The “ultraminimal state” is one of those
conceptual categories, invented by Nozick for use in adding gradation to the conceptual distance
between capitalist anarchy (protection and ‘state-like’ services provided by corporate or private
entities) and a ‘state.’ The ultraminimal state is meant to distinguish as both are providing
“protection and enforcement services,” but the services of the ultraminimal state are paid only to
the members of society who voluntarily pay into its protection scheme.36 The ultraminimal state
for Nozick must, on the terms of a moral progression, develop into a minimal state. The
relationship of moral progression that Nozick outlines implies the moral inferiority of the
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ultraminimal state by the fact of its operators being considered “morally obligated” to proceed
into the minimal state.37
The ultraminimal state, in Nozick’s historical framework, is the first ‘statelike entity’ for
which legal rights—that is to say pragmatic rights which are decided upon, described, and
enforced through the mechanisms of a state—can be observed within the functioning of that
entity. Nozick defines rights, legal or otherwise, as side constraints to establish a claim to how
rights direct the traffic of moral relationships. As side constraint, it is not that people move
towards the ideals which rights represent and codify, but rather that rights prevent actions in the
direction of other people, rights repulse.38 The idea of side constraints is both a marker and a
product of Nozick’s relationship to the larger generation of moral libertarian thought. The side
constraint develops the ideology’s throughline theory of the sacrosanct individual, and is in many
ways a more completely developed theory of right. Nozick expresses and validates Rothbard’s
configuration of the non-aggression axiom as a right, amongst other rights which Nozick
considers human beings to possess inherently.39 Nozick offers this explanation of how the
non-aggression axiom would result from the philosophical circumstances as Nozick sees them:
“This root idea, namely, that there are different individuals with separate lives and so no one may
be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints, but it also, I believe,
leads to a libertarian side constraint that prohibits aggression against another.”40 The ‘root idea,’
the separateness of persons, is intellectual baggage from is from Rawls, and which Nozick is also
applying (possibly appropriating) for the purpose of arguing against utilitarian concerns.
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Nozick’s essential moral perspective, in terms of the separateness of persons, “[treating]
individual lives as morally important units,” in distinction to the strict utilitarian account.41 These
individuals are the basic moral unit, are morally important, and in conjunction with the claim that
Nozick has asserted that each individual has intrinsic rights, rights which must be respected due
to their moral importance, the non-aggression principle can be logically concluded, and in some
sense ‘falls out’ of those two claims interacting. Maintaining the non-aggression axiom keeps
with the tradition of moral libertarianism, but Nozick makes a crucial distinction between a
non-aggression principle and a non-aggression axiom, favoring the former.
Rothbard justifies the axiom (with due notice given to the continuing distinction between
principle and axiom) as the result of deriving from self-ownership. The derivation, modeled on
Locke’s own account of property, defines axiom as the “the absolute right to be "free" from
aggression,” and the “central axiom of the libertarian creed.”42 and therefore the non-aggression
principle is not only the first right, but also the only possible right . There is only that single right
and its violations when considering morality. Rothbard also to someone degree offers a primitive
description of separateness of persons, but Nozick uses the idea of the separateness of persons to
further complete the logic of self-ownership and, operating under this summary of separateness,
clarifies its libertarian implications in the expression: “[by virtue of reflecting] the fact of our
separate existences … [...][that] there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as
to lead to a greater overall social good.”43 As McKerlie notes, Nozick is not grounding the
argument here, but is presenting a different interpretation of the moral ontology of the world,
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with the individual being the base unit. This configuration is not a grounding, but rather is a sort
of matching; rights are understood as matching an intuition about morality which is constituted
by certain large moral frameworks. As Nozick applies it, the separateness of persons becomes a
means of justifying libertarian individualism, bolstering Rothbard’s claim that the individual is
the only ‘real’ unit deserving moral protections by attempting to refute the utilitarian claim to
what Nozick calls “a greater overall social good.” The model of the individual which Nozick
establishes, on the terms of general libertarian argument, is more robustly defended as the
principle moral agent by having a counter-argument to utilitarianism, and also abandons the
axiomatic logic of Rothbard. In that sense, Nozick could actually be seen as putting forward a
weaker assertion of the Abandoning axiomatic logic does leave the philosophy more imprecise,
as Nozick’s account of the principle is suggested, but not defined, by the separateness of persons
and is left without a defined ground as Nozick procedes. But, at the cost of that imprecision,
Nozick reframes the principle as a right which exists, but which is not in the position of serving
as the axiomatic core of the ideology (which, as axiomatic, is inherently unprovable) and instead
substitutes axiom for what might be considered a general a general intuition of rights. Using the
intuition of rights offers some benefits, as it allows for rights to be conceived and presented on a
rolling basis, and justified on the basis of observations about the conditions of human existence,
a strong if not infallible method of justification, and often equally proficient as a means of
justification to axioms within the more than enough when applied to the realm of real politics.
Moreover, American citizens have rights, which are legally defined, inviolable and protected as a
matter of fact. Nozick’s assumption of the (minimal) state as an answer to the moral problem of
protecting rights clarifies that Nozick is offering in one sense a philosophy of rights with which
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to define moral limits to what rights a liberal state such as America might enforce, and how.
However, the morality which Nozick advances becomes fraught when it actually comes into
contact with legalized rights, and therefore the formulation of a theoretical defense is not a
necessary approach.
In a morality that is so intertwined with rights, the principle ambiguities of that moral
system rapidly escalate to legalistic problems: if the immoral is defined by the violation of rights,
and seeing as Nozick only references articulates the non-aggression principle along the lines of
property rights and their violation, whether or not there is a system for weighing different moral
violations remains an outstanding problem for a world in which the right to self-defense is
deferred to a state. The problem of this ambiguity is twofold, the moral weight of different
violations is uncertain. Nozick himself fluctuates between several apparent metrics for measuring
moral violations different systems assigning moral weight, sometimes measuring violations per
instance, and sometimes by the severity of the violation, and sometimes just by whether or not
violations have occurred at all. The problem is that an ambiguous definition of violations leaves
the problem of legal justice unaddressed, as the capacity of the state to protect its citizens from
moral violations entails punishments which may, if left unexamined, violate moral rights in turn.
The difference between murder and theft serves as the ultimate expression of this problem.
Nozick makes allowances for two responses to moral violations, namely punishment and the
exaction of compensation. To reasonably derive appropriate punishments for murder and theft
respectively requires that there be a morality which distinguishes between those two things at a
moral level for the purposes of punishment, or is able to make a declaration of worth for
purposes of compensation. The moral weight is important, and the ambiguity relevant, due to the
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fact that Nozick is both declaring the importance of these violations to morality, and also trying
to assert the moral inviolability of each individual. Nozick avoids specifying the specific rights
which belong to the individual except to say that “[side] constraints are set … in our theory, by
the Lockean rights people possess.”44 The deference to Locke on the issue of the individual rights
presumes that, at least for the purpose of evaluating Nozick’s moral system, the rights can be
provisionally assumed to be property rights as outlined in Locke. The ‘Lockean rights,’ assumed
to be all rights which Locke explicitly defines as such, include the right to “life, liberty, and
possession” under the moral-conceptual category of “property,” with the right to “judge and
punish breaches of the law of nature — punishing in the manner he thinks the crime deserves”
appended.45 However, Nozick leaves unspecified whether these rights arrive within the same
conceptual framework as Locke, or whether they are being parsed into a set of conceptually
separate rights. Assuming the former, as Nozick makes no distinction and also invokes Locke,
the basis of property rights can still be considered to be the initial and intrinsic ownership of the
self, as Locke specifies. Therefore, it might be taken that property is also the primary medium
through which Nozick’s morality can be applied and understood. The extent of the moral status
of the individual, and their inviolability, is bound up with the violation of the property of another
person. Property, which is presumably understood in the Lockean sense to encompass to include
the proprietor’s body and what they claim as their possessions and liberty, delimits exactly where
the moral ‘domain’ of the individual begins and ends. How Nozick addresses this moral
‘domain’ has important consequences for how the Lockean system of rights can be understood as
a moral system, and by extension how the libertarian morality is involved in re-interpreting and
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applying Lockean ideas. “A line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an
individual.”
The idea of a moral ‘domain’ is addressed by Nozick in the form of an idea of moral
space, in which is to describe the way in which every object which belongs to an individual
becomes part of the moral violation of the individual, not just in Nozick but in any
property-based moral system. “[a] line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space
around an individual.”46 If the property was not somehow morally rooted in an individual,
stealing it, or any other form of more indirect violation of property, it would not be possible to
trace how theft was in fact a violation. On the basis that all property violations are violations of
the individual, extended to their property, then it would follow that all moral violations would
essentially ‘count’ the same when trying to calculate damage. Intuitively however, the difference
between a crime such as murder and a crime such as theft should be clearly delineated and
somehow accounted for, despite both being reducible to property violations. Nozick often defers
the development of the intricacies of his own philosophy, but the absence of an answer still
leaves a sizable gap in the structure of Nozick’s logic, which, as noted earlier, is a substantial
problem for a philosophy which is dependent on the sustained non-violation of key rights, an
inviolability which may well be unraveled by problems concerning punishment and
compensation. Developing both lines of critique, if compensation is admitted as a means by
which moral violations might be remedied, then the problem becomes whether or not murder is
to be admitted amongst those violations which may be compensated, and if so how a precise
compensation is to be generated for the death of a person. Nozick’s philosophy, because it is
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unable to morally distinguish That Nozick refuses to connect the concept of moral violation to a
system for weighing those violations appropriately may or may not be deliberate their context is
not deliberate, but rather reflects an oversight in Nozick. What that ambiguity does allow for
however, is that is for the conception of rights which that Nozick devises to be applied
throughout Anarchy, State, & Utopia essentially in whatever format straightens out whatever
mechanics Nozick is attempting to reckon with.
The work which produces the minimal state, is however, not only ambiguous, but deeply
mundane in the sense of its conceptual proximity to the American liberal state. Nozick
introduces the concept of utopia, and attempts to elucidate not only how the most basic model of
the liberal state is actually itself a utopia, but also performs interesting semantic maneuvers to
actually maintain the inspirational character of utopia. Nozick’s investigations into the concept
of utopia are finalized with the conclusion that the concept of utopia has been demonstrated to be
functionally the same as identical to the minimal state.47 The question of utopia generally is
framed by Nozick as a world out of a set of all possible worlds in which all actors would rather
remain in that world than travel to another possible world.48 Overlooking some granularities in
the thought-experiment (personal values, the scope of ‘possible worlds’, etc.) the basic premise
of utopia for Nozick is essentially established upon choice. Thus Nozick’s utopia is measured not
by standards of perfection or perfectability, but rather optimization. The radical difference
between Nozick’s ‘utopia’ and traditional notions of utopia reveal the implicit bias in any
conception of utopia, but Nozick attempts to leverage that bias in the same moment. Nozick’s
utopia is functional in its definition, which is to say that in the same way a price is determined in
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the emergent order of market forces, so might a utopia be determined in the emergent order of
desires interacting en masse.
The idea of these massed desires manifests as the concept of the ‘meta-utopia’: “Utopia is
a framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue
and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one
can impose his own utopian vision upon others.”49 This movement away from a ‘common sense’
definition of utopia is neither inert, nor necessarily coherent with the rest of Nozick’s intellectual
project in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. From Wolff, there are two characterizations of Nozick
which might frame how Nozick’s definition of utopia might be subversively presented.
“[Nozick’s deontological libertarianism] is based on a strict doctrine of natural rights, violation
of which is never permitted, whatever the consequences.”50 Wolff here describes Nozick’s
project and how Nozick perceives his own project. Secondly, Wolff asserts the failure of
deontological libertarianism to philosophically defend free-market capitalism successfully:
“unless they dishonestly smuggle consequentialist considerations into the definition of rights of
self-ownership.”51 The unmentioned subject of that accusation of ‘dishonest smuggling’ is not
Nozick, but the notion of ‘dishonest smuggling’ is an appropriate moniker of how Nozick
approaches his construction of a definition of a ‘utopia.’ Nozick constructs a notion of utopia
‘dishonestly’ in that Nozick’s general premise is to document the process of working up from
first principles. However, Nozick’s ‘utopia,’ on the basis of the testing principle it uses to
determine a ‘utopia,’ defines utopia in such a way as to encourage the equation of utopia with
moral state.
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For Nozick, the apparent purpose project of exploring the concept of utopia is to justify
an initial premise, that “that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right.”52 Whether or not the
Nozickian utopia is inspirational within the larger framework of the deontological approach is
entirely superfluous to the argument. But the ‘rigor’ of Nozick’s analytic approach, which Wolff
describes as part of the psychological appeal of deontological argumentation, is an unemotional
and sterile way of conceiving a politics. Moreover, deontological arguments still require some
sort of Kantian consensus, in which the rational audience will acknowledge the rationality of the
argument and carry it out solely on the basis of their own rationality. The pragmatic issue is that
appeals to the sort of abstract rationality which Nozick works with rarely, if ever, are is able to
engendered political movements. As Nozick asks, “Can it thrill the heart or inspire people to
struggle or sacrifice? Would anyone man barricades under its banner?”53 Utopia, in the
commonplace sense of that term, carries an emotive drive because of how the idea of imagining
or being converted to a visionf the value and possibly the innate beauty of the concept as it is
presented. The rhetoric of utopia compels the completion of the political task of building utopia
intrinsically. One of the offerings of a consequentialist theory of politics is that the proposed
rewards drive political action by appealing to self-interest. In the absence of such
consequentialist appeals. Nozick actually sins doubly. The first is made on the position that
Nozick is being disingenuous, and actually is writing utopia as a concept which supports the
minimal state automatically. From the position, it is eminently clear that Nozick is attempting to
leverage the traditional emotional drive of the intonation of other ideas of utopia to both evoke in
designate the minimal state an as ‘inspiring,’ feeling, and, as a utopia, the object of some
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instinctual desire usually associated with those things. The second is that, as Wolff diagnosed,
Nozick smuggles consequentialist arguments in the form of his conceptualization of utopia as a
meta-utopia. The problems of the meta-utopia in general are an important touchstone in
understanding the horizons of Nozick’s thought, and the situation it leaves moral libertarianism
in.
Nozick’s notion of the minimal state as a ‘meta-utopia’ (and afterall, more utopias are
greater than fewer utopias) is a significant indicator of how Nozick the argument for moral
libertarianism as Nozick conveys imagines itself as somehow higher than an appeal to a specific
way or form of life. undermines the general notion of utopia. There is a basic problematic
premise in the claim to the minimal state as the necessary condition for enabling utopia
sub-communities within the community of the minimal state. By the same essential open
conditions that define the testing principle of utopia which Nozick proposes, certain notions of
utopia would entail the desire to construct a utopia which contradicts the notions of Nozickian
utopia. The presiding question would be: why does Nozick allow for say a socialist utopia within
the minimal state (as a framework) when the two are postured to eventually contradict each
other? Nozick’s configuration is that every utopia within the meta-utopia must be formulated
with the caveat of not violating the principles of the meta-utopia, of accepting its place within a
substrate of society. The limitations upon the possible realizations of the utopia(s) within this
meta-utopia framework suggests that when faced with reality, the meta-utopia can be assumed to
actually fail to ensure a flourishing of pluralistic utopias. In either case, verifying this is
impossible. But Nozick’s premise of utopia is tested by the thought experiment of keeping
everyone in one possible world voluntarily.
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The utopia of Nozick is still haunted by the ideas of Rawls. The conversation between the
work of Nozick and Rawls charts to some extent a larger political battle that libertarianism
emerged into. The Vietnam era compromised the perception of American liberal democracy. In
the aftermath, political claims that extended out of the conceptual schemes of liberalism arose
out of the exposed flaws in liberalism. Articulating the exact objects of criticism is unimportant,
the fact remains that the two predominant movements of reaction were split between social
democracy and libertarianism. In that sense, Nozick was actually indebted to Rawls as the
articulator of the exact sense of liberalism which Nozick’s libertarian political impulses were
forming against. Nozick’s utopia is the weird byproduct of the attempt to establish a libertarian
future for liberalism, and to portray the libertarian vision of striped down liberalism as a vision to
be inspired by. How moral libertarianism at large interfaces with the general social liberalism
however, produces much more interesting lines of thought.
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Theoretical Analysis

Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, ended the inaugural era of moral libertarianism by
bridging the divide that Rothbard had built between the philosophical base of moral
libertarianism and its parent ideology, liberalism, which was coming into full bloom in America.
The neo-liberal regime in America, that began within the year of the publishing of Anarchy,
State, and Utopia with the hiring of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve head marked the beginning
of a new opportunity for libertarian politics. The age of neoliberalism fused together formerly
disparate political elements, creating a political environment in which both laissez-faire
economics (traditionally conservative in America) and social welfare (traditionally progressive)
were gravitating together under one ideology. The neoliberal paradigm re-affirmed the economic
vision of Hayek and other liberal economists and put them into practice. The neoliberal shift
largely ended debate over best economic practices in the final third of the 20th century, allowing
social questions to be explored further. The moral libertarians were uniquely positioned to
provide an ideology by which to address these social questions, and also to address state power
in the age of the internationalist, neoliberal America.
A novel understanding moral libertarianism might be achieved by considering both how
moral libertarianism conforms, or does not conform, to established frameworks of liberalism,
and how moral libertarianism relates to its sibling ideology, social liberalism. The concept of
positive & negative liberty, as proposed by Isaiah Berlin, serves as the framework which will be
considered on this basis: it is a prominent description of the inner conflicts of liberalism, has
been used by other scholars to describe libertarianism, and the definitions of negative liberty are
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often represented by effective proxies in moral libertarian thought. The other relationship which
there is to be an attempt to analyze, being the relationship between moral libertarianism and
social liberalism, is eminently applicable, as historically the two have been contrasted
intellectually, per the portrayal of the Rawls vs. Nozick ‘debate.’ The contrast is far from
arbitrary however; social liberalism and moral libertarianism in conversation creates a fruitful
binary which not only informs the positive / negative liberty framework, but also provides the
necessary juxtaposition to gain insight into how the ideas of liberalism are being handled by
moral libertarianism.
Isaiah Berlin’s concepts of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty has been perhaps the most
influential description of the concept of liberty produced in the recent history of liberalism.
Positive liberty is defined by Berlin as “freedom of … self-direction” while negative liberty is
defined as “freedom of the individual not to be interfered with within a defined area.”54 The
difference might be simplified as the freedom to vs. the freedom from respectively. Libertarians
in general have been often described or characterized as exclusive proponents of negative liberty,
and at times as opponents of positive liberty, as with Friedman’s account.55 This characterization
is largely correct for libertarianism in general, and is completely true within the moral
libertarians.56 However, the claim to a strict division between positive and negative liberties,
when tested vigorously against both the moral libertarians and the social liberals, are undermined
in ways which suggest that the difference may in fact be rhetorical. The social liberals might be
considered to be positive liberty analogs to the moral libertarians. The theoretical frameworks of
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Rawls often appeal to positive liberty, such as the original position and its premises, that “those
who engage in social cooperation choose together … the principles which are to assign basic
rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.”57 Rawls’ principles of justice58
as do the programs of the New Deal and other proposals from Pres. Roosevelt. The social liberals
generally might be taken as representing a platform of freedoms to, although in the same way as
the moral libertarians, these categories fall apart. Positive liberty, and therefore the social
liberals, offer a particularly compelling avenue to investigate how the categories of positive and
negative liberty fail due to Berlin’s admission that: “No doubt every interpretation of the word
liberty, however unusual, must include a minimum of what I have called `negative' liberty. There
must be an area within which I am not frustrated. No society literally suppresses all the liberties
of its members; a being who is prevented by others from doing anything at all on his own is not a
moral agent at all, and could not either legally or morally be regarded as a human being.”59 The
admission that negative liberty is always part of any conception of liberty belies the possibility
that in the same way a positive liberty is always present in any conception of liberty, or appeal to
liberty. Certain political claims from Roosevelt, and the way in which these claim are structured,
demonstrate how both categories of liberty are present in any conception of liberty.
The Roosevelt presidency produced a dramatic proposal of guiding principles to guide
the crafting of legislation to increase the scope of American citizenship and its entitlements, in
what is known as the “Four Freedoms” speech. The rhetorical moves which are contained in the
speech expose faults in the dichotomous relationship of positive and negative liberty. Of
particular note is the third freedom, “the freedom from want–which, translated into world terms,
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means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its
inhabitants-everywhere in the world.”60 Freedom from want as “economic understandings which
will secure … a healthy peacetime life,” has many of the trappings of a claim to positive liberty,
but is expressed as negative liberty, the freedom not to be interfered with by want. Although the
example may appear spurious, the claim is also verifiable in terms of the reverse, through a
negative claim that is ventured through a rhetoric of positive liberty. Ayn Rand writes, “men are
free to trade, with reason and reality as their only arbiter, when no man may use physical force to
extort the consent of another.”61 Here not only is a positive claim ventured that is seemingly
caused by negative, “men are free to trade” is actually the direct corollary of “when no man may
use physical force,” but also the interchangeability and interdependence of both are placed next
to one another in natural juxtaposition. “Men are free to trade” is only another way of expressing
the negative version, that ‘men are free from forces which might threaten their trade.’ The
negative expression, “no man may use physical force,” is synonymous with the positive form,
“every man may expect to live a life free of violence. In the end, the difference between the two
forms of expression, despite appealing to different liberties, convey the same meaning and
achieve the same end. Also, to the same degree that the rhetoric of liberty is interchangeable, the
theory of positive and negative liberty also implies interdependence. Assuming that negative and
positive liberty were discrete categories, what is the rationale of liberty required to justify
self-defense? As Locke configures it, the positive liberty to self-defense and punishment of
criminals is derived from the negative liberty to his property, one cannot protect one’s negative
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liberty without the ability to practice the positive liberty. Of course, by the interchangeability of
these categories, that relationship may be inverted. The collapse of negative liberty as discrete
category does however open up for discussion how the libertarians are articulating a purist,
coherent idea of property rights and the non-aggression principle And Locke, gets around the
problem of the semantics of negativity and positivity, explaining the reliance of the better half of
the moral libertarian thinkers on the framework Locke provides.62
The prevailing explanation of property amongst the moral libertarians is the Lockean
account: “every man has a property in his own person.”63 For Locke, due to the ownership of
labor through self-ownership, and the ownership of possessions through the admixture of labor,
all possessions are, by logical extension, of the same moral status as the individual. For Locke,
labor is a sort of metaphysical process which creates a bond between the individual and anything
which the individual labors upon that is either the person’s possession, or still out in the world of
commons.64 Disregarding the question of how or why it is labor which accomplishes the process
of transforming common resources into own property, the relationship is clearly the movement
between domains of ownership. The origin of all property is the ownership of the self, and
therefore, everything that is owned is owned by extension of how labor instills a part of that
original self-ownership in everything it labors upon. MacPhearson describes this doctrine in
Locke as part of a larger historical idea of ‘possessive individualism,’ manifested in Locke by the
condition of the individual, that “[t]he individual is proprietor of his own person, for which he
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owes nothing to society.”65 The doctrine of possessive individualism is essentially the governing
logic of the moral libertarians, and also creates a method by which the to get around the problem
of the negative-positive liberty confusion. The right of self-ownership is intrinsic in such a way
that it relies neither on positive nor negative liberty precisely to define how it operates, it merely
is the condition of being human. From that proprietorship, one can integrate possessions into
your domain by “mixing” them with your labor. In summary, the every item of property is only
property in relationship to an individual. From that relationship, it might be inferred, as noted in
the discussion of Nozick, that all property violations might also be understood as a violation of
the individual, seeing as all property is metaphysically invested with the ‘essence’ of individual
ownership by labor. The individual is also understood as being the property of itself, and as
property, the individual exists within the same moral category as possessions. The present danger
of equating human beings to property at the level of moral categories is that attempts to create a
framework for thinking about how to evaluate moral violations already presumes some
equivalency between individuals and their property. This summation of the problems of the
Lockean system has already been examined in the study of Nozick, focusing on the problem of
moral weight. But the outstanding question is why the philosophy of the moral libertarians
cannot discard Locke and the accompanying problems.
The Lockean labor theory of property inadvertently renders both person and possession
into the category of property, and the equivalency that is created when both of those things enter
into the same category is actually useful for the moral libertarian ideology. The morality of the
politics of redistribution are fundamentally premised on a moral difference between person and
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property, in the sense that person has a moral priority over property. Welfare programs, land
reforms, and other projects of redistribution rely on the ability to tax citizens or otherwise
appropriate varying degrees of their property for the sake of bettering the conditions of other
people. To be able to stake a claim against that sort of redistribution, an equivalency between
person and property creates a logic in which social welfare cannot be asserted as a greater
concern than the right of property. By incorporating the individual into property as a moral
category, the Lockean model of property argues the inviolacy of possessions by rendering them
indistinguishable from the value of a human life. The moral libertarians require exactly what the
self-ownership schema of Locke offers: the intertwining of intrinsic rights, and a concept of
property which has moral importance, in this case by elevating possessions to the moral stakes of
the human body, and life. Property, as the primary right of Locke and his moral libertarian
grandchildren, both ambiguates the lines between person and possession morally, while also
elevating possession to the level of personhood, granting possessions moral importance, and also
implying through the totalizing category that personhood is at stake in possession. The
consequences of Locke’s argument are not apparent until the point at which laws must be
arranged so as to account for moral violations. The groundwork of Lockeanism, that seems to
render the individual indistinguishable from their property, leaves no meaningful guideline for
devising laws, except by providing some sort of exceptional quality to that first self-ownership.
However, even in the case of an exception for the “first ownership” of the person, separating the
owner from the property, such an argument would undermine the framework of Lockean
property, as it would remove the source for property acquisition. There the Hegelian iteration of
the argument returns, separating the individual from property, but also creating the basic notion
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that the individual cannot be evaluated or generated on the sole basis of property or of
self-ownership. That problem is not necessarily some absolute metaphysical concern, but that in
the course of creating a liberal society, the methods and systems by which liberalism produces
legal systems or how liberal citizens conceive their own rights are going to be inevitably rooted
in how the generally accepted moral status of people, possession, and property which have been
established.

Thoughts on Moral Libertarianism & Ideology

Moral libertarianism has always been established in a binary between itself and social
liberalism, as matter of historical proximity, and of disagreement in theory and policy. However,
the binary relationship between moral libertarianism and social liberalism is not a relationship of
pure opposition. As evidenced by the inadequacy of the negative liberty / positive liberty schema
in describing the divide between moral libertarianism and social liberalism, the relationship is
defined largely by shared principles. Broadly, the ideologies66 share the fundamental principles
of liberalism, namely equal rights, freedom of the individual, and (to differing extents)
competitive markets. Rothbard appears to be a problematic edge case, but deeper consideration
of the project of Rothbard reveals that Rothbard is not so far ideologically removed from
liberalism. Firstly, the stateless society that Rothbard describes performs essentially the same
functions as a liberal society with a state. Secondly, anarcho-capitalism, also advocates
essentially the same political principles (rights, freedom, markets) as the general liberalism, but
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differs strongly in considerations of implementation. The general ideology of liberalism bridges
the two poles of the binary.
Understanding the poles of the binary as being connected in this way outlines an intimate
network of relationship which can be described as a single parent ideology which is related to
two sub-ideologies, which are in turn related to each other by their shared heritage. The intimacy
of these ideologies might be described as an intimacy in the sense that they largely share basic
political principles in such a way that there are premises which can be taken as universal within
the whole network. However, liberalism, as the parent ideology, passes down these universal
principles to the two sub-ideologies, or at least defines what makes up ‘universal’ principles
within the network. Therefore the relationships are actually defined by the hierarchy of theory in
which liberalism is the dominant ideology. By virtue of the hierarchy governing the whole
network of relationships, what the sub-ideologies are doing in relationship to the parent ideology
might be reframed.
In relationship to the dominant parent ideology, the question arises whether or not the
sub-ideologies constitute legitimately independent ideologies, or if these sub-ideologies are too
dependent on the parent ideology for determining their principles to be considered anything other
than ‘extensions’ of the parent ideology. The ambiguity of the idea of an extension clears the
way to think about these ‘ideologies’ as relating to or interfacing with ‘proper’ ideologies (such
as liberalism) in ways which ask important questions about the definition of ideology and their
formation. The possibility which will be argued for here is the possibility of moral libertarianism
and social liberalisms as ‘ethics’ of liberalism.67 Ethics here is not equivalent to deontology, the
67
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signature argumentative method of the moral libertarians. Ethics here would refer to the way in
which moral libertarianism and social liberalism lodge claims to how liberalism ought t o be
practiced, while still essentially agreeing on the basic principles which define liberalism. There
are some indications in the moral libertarian literature that the authors considered themselves to
be, in certain ways, relating to liberalism according to this model. Rand appeals to a return, then
a surpassing of the political vision of the liberal Founding Fathers,68 and Rothbard actually refers
to the liberalism of Locke as “libertarian classical liberalism,” and early liberalism as a “radical
libertarian” doctrine.69 In both cases, the author establishes a relationship to liberalism as a
predecessor, or a parent ideology, to their own.
However, describing moral libertarianism as an ethics of liberalism only generates further
questions, and the idea of an ethics of an ideology in general demand the establishment of
conditions so as to define and clarify the difference between an ethics and an ideology. The idea
of an ethics is fundamentally premised on the idea of an extension of a certain ideology, which is
to say that its own claims are based in another ideology, but what original contributions are made
by the ethics do not constitute a new ideology. The problem may be that there cannot be a
quantitative point at which an ideology has sufficiently developed itself so as to become
independent of any sort of parent ideology, or other existing ideology. In such a case, the point of
distinction may instead be qualitative. Plausibly, an ethics could be defined as any system of
thought which makes claims to how a separate ideology is practiced or thought about without
modifying the basic principles or pretensions of that ideology. The point at which it becomes an
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independent ideology could then be defined as the point at which a system of thought, say moral
libertarianism, actually modifies the majority of basic principles or pretensions.
The applications of such an idea might hold repercussions in the area of studying culture,
hegemony, or the development of politics. The claim, that moral libertarianism is not itself an
independent ideology from liberalism, casts the entire project of libertarianism in a new light, as
it both binds the ideology more closely to liberalism, and also denies the ability of libertarianism,
as it stands, to transcend liberalism, it will always be replicating the paradigm of liberalism. The
difference between an ethics and an ideology, if valid, might imply other potentially worthwhile
lines of study, but until that point only provides the function of demonstrating one form of the
relationship of libertarianism and liberalism.
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Conclusion

The moral libertarians, simply, represent the sect of deontological libertarians who sought
to argue the case of libertarianism from the point of the individual. The philosophical distrust of
the state which is shared between the whole of the movement is tied closely to the dependency of
the whole group upon the model of rights and freedom which Locke espoused, and similarly to
Locke, the moral libertarians only ever concede to the state as source of protection from
aggression. In a sense, the moral libertarians were merely re-articulators of Locke for a situation
which seemed to demand it. Such is the extent of the relationship between the libertarians and
the godfather of liberalism. However, Nozick, Rothbard, and Rand all equally pushed at the
boundaries of libertarian tradition, and sought to introduce new ways of thinking in the logic of
property and non-aggression.
The moral libertarians, although they achieved neither the sort of mass support required
to transform political society in America, nor some titanic party to challenge the American
regime (and perhaps that is by their nature) still produced an ideology whose repercussions
continue to ricochet throughout American politics. Contemporary politics, from the question of
gay marriage to marijuana legalization to the wars in the Middle East have all incorporated the
argumentative forms of the moral libertarians. Regardless of the precision of the ideological
correspondence between the libertarians and the political agents mimicking their ideas and
methods, there has been some successful transfer to the sphere of mainstream ideas those ideals
that were championed by the moral libertarians. Even Rand’s relatively unformed ideology of
selfishness continues to influence modern capitalists, entrepreneurs, and politicians, a formidable

62
and influential social reach for the goddess of the market. The Koch Brothers have spent millions
of dollars lobbying on behalf of libertarian changes in the structure not only of the Republican
party but of institutions and individuals all across America. Those brothers, who are nothing
more than two millionaires interested in smaller government have still wrought more change
than the most organized efforts of the malevolent State. They have wielded the State against
itself, and still have done more to demonstrate the evils of the private realm than Rothbard could
ever have imagined. Perhaps, in the most idyllic libertarian imagination, their machinations
would mark the coming of some more free world, but their money passes through too many dark
passages to maintain any false optimism. The libertarianism which has contorted itself fill the
gaps in the ideology of modern liberalism does not fit the lofty profile of its founders.
And yet, libertarians are seemingly the only ideology of the modern right which maintain
a progressive notion of human freedom. Consideration of the other ideologies of the American
right-wing yields an array of truly conservative political movements : the neoconservatives, the
nationalist-populists, and the Evangelical Christian block. The neoconservatives offer strong-arm
foreign interventionism which is fundamentally based on the willingness to commit to
extraordinary brash endeavors of violence and Realpolitik, in the name of ensuring continued
American hegemony. The nationalist-populists clamor for the strengthening of the state, so as to
be able to halt immigration, solidify the borders, and return the country to a glorious past in
which it was mighty and triumphant. The Christian right is defined by an urgent desire for
regulation of the social sphere by the state, seeking control of abortion, marriage, and education,
while also advocating interventionism for the purpose of economically and militaristically
supporting Israel. The moral libertarian position, from whichever point it is approached,
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renounces global hegemony, borders, regulation of any free exchange between adults, wars
overseas (or at home) and, most of all, the expansion of state powers which is meant to enact it
all. The libertarians, as noxious as their ideology might appear to critics of capitalism,
fundamentally believe in the possibility of human freedom to be extended, and the reform of
society along lines of evidently true critiques. The American State does sacrifice the lives of
thousand of faceless foreigners to the machine of global hegemony. The American State does,
inadvertently or otherwise, create regulations which protect large business interests, stabilizing
the economic status quo and preventing the disruption of a political-economic order in which the
lines between politician and businessman are permeable. The American State does subject its
citizens to humiliation, obstruction, and violence, often without recognition, recompensation, or
even an expressed will to change. The liberal right at large blinds itself to these critiques, while
the libertarian faction refuses to look away.
The libertarian movement at large has charted progress in diverse ways, but the moral
libertarians provided a framework for libertarian principles to be directed towards the specific
end of reforming targeted social ills. There is no attempt here to create a non-rhetorical or
absolute definition of progress. But at the very minimum, moral libertarianism is progressive in
comparison to the other right wing ideologies which it shares political space with, who
consistently demonstrate a politics of open hierarchy, casual violence, exclusion of minorities,
and otherwise solidifying the power of traditional institutions. The moral libertarians at the very
least appear progressive by contrast, offering a right wing ideology opposed to state violence,
opposed to state control over individual lives, in favor of the expansion of the rights of the
individual and the abundance of freedom. The moral libertarians, as critics of the state, are
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wholly progressive in the context of any ethical violations by the state, although notably failing
to meet standards of progressive discourse when redistributive economic justice is concerned. In
the more rarefied strains of Rothbard’s economic analysis however, a trend towards a more even
economic redistribution is even assumed once the support structures which have been erected
between big business and government have been removed.70 Perhaps with the exception of Rand,
the moral libertarians do not offer a vision of an economically stratified society, only one in
which the government does not regulate free economic exchange. However, the circumstantial
accounts cannot be treated as more than conjecture, at least until an organized libertarian
movement is able to grab ahold of political power.
The Libertarian Party of the United States, perhaps the largest attempt at organizing on
behalf of the libertarian ideology, is dominated by the ideology of moral libertarianism, building
a platform which is a sort of synthesis of the thinkers of the moral libertarian generation. The
party offers a series of platform positions on its website which might be dissected so as to reveal
their heritage. From the section ‘Personal Liberty’: “Individuals are inherently free to make
choices for themselves and must accept responsibility for the consequences of the choices they
make. [...] No individual, group, or government may rightly initiate force against any other
individual, group, or government. Libertarians reject the notion that groups have inherent rights.
We support the rights of the smallest minority, the individual.” The non-aggression axiom, what
Rothbard considered to be the central idea of libertarianism, is unequivocally stated, not as
belief, but as fact, as axiom, as ethical truth. Rights are reserved for the individual, denying the
collective any rights at all, referencing not only Rothbard’s abstract societies, but more generally
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the invectives of Rand against the ungrateful masses. Taking ‘responsibility for consequences’ is
a moral behavior which Rand directly endorses,71 and which Rothbard asserts as a matter of
course. Another quotation delves further into the relationship between individual and
government: “The protection of individual rights is the only proper purpose of government.
Government is constitutionally limited so as to prevent the infringement of individual rights by
the government itself. The principle of non-initiation force should guide the relationships
between governments.” The retention of the government diverges from the anarchist tendencies
of Rothbard and directs the political ambitions of the party towards the modified liberalism
which defined the philosophies of Rand and Nozick. The framework of constitutional limitations
grounds the party in the American context, and also provides a coherent, pragmatic grounds upon
which to maintain the stability of the political vision which Nozick outlined in depth.
The Libertarian Party in many ways may be a sign of changing tides for the modern
libertarian movement. The party has almost doubled in size since 2008, the aforementioned
presidential candidate Gary Johnson was involved in a record presidential campaign for the
libertarians, and if growth trends continue, automatic debate access could be triggered. The party
stands, bound up in the systems of thought which the moral libertarianism created, and woefully
understudied even as they emerge more and more visibly onto the American political scene. The
future, past, and present of the libertarian movement must continue to be studied, and the moral
libertarians understood, not as outsiders, but as the children of liberalism. Further interrogation
of the relationships of parentage between what are thought of as distinct ideologies, and the
history of development in the thought of as-yet unstudied moral libertarians, would serve greatly
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to benefit the general understanding of how libertarianism emerges at a conceptual level, and
thus how to understand libertarianism as it unfolds, and ideology generally.
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